The question of free will and its relationship to divine volition represents one of the most significant theological and exegetical debates in Islamic thought. Within this discourse, two extreme positions - determinism (jabr) and absolute libertarianism (tafwiḍh) - have emerged as polarizing readings concerning the relationship between human will and divine volition. Verse 29 of Sūrat al-Takwir ("And you do not will except that God, the Lord of the worlds, wills") is among those verses that, due to its interpretive capacities, has given rise to various interpretations in this regard. Certain exegetes, including Thaʿlabī, Meyboudi, and Fakhr al-Rāzī, emphasizing the dependence of human will upon divine volition, have advanced interpretations that in some formulations tend toward determinist readings. In contrast, a meticulous analysis of the verse's indicatory meaning (dalālah), its context (siyāq), and the collective Quranic teachings concerning human agency and responsibility demonstrates that the purport of the verse can be understood as negating human independence from God without, however, negating human free will and accountability.
The present study, employing a descriptive-analytical method and drawing upon Quranic verses, exegetical traditions (riwāyat), and a critical examination of the interpretive perspectives of Thaʿlabī, Meyboudi, and Fakhr al-Rāzi, undertakes a critical analysis of the interpretations surrounding this verse. The findings of this research indicate that the exegetical traditions pertaining to the verse fundamentally support the dependence of human will on divine volition and negate absolute libertarianism (tafwīḍ). However, transforming this meaning into a denial of human free will requires further argumentation. According to the doctrine of al-amr bayn al-amrayn (the position between the two extremes), human will is realized subordinately to divine will and within the framework of His volition. Accordingly, human beings remain free and responsible for their actions, while their power and agency are ultimately dependent upon divine grace and volition.