This study aims to uncover the epistemological presuppositions of the Holy Qur'an regarding the concept of "ignorance" (jahl) and to provide a systematic analysis of it, drawing on Qur'anic and narrative data and utilizing the contemporary theoretical framework of "virtue epistemology." Focusing on the verses in which derivatives of the root j-h-l appear, alongside an analysis of the narrations from the Kitab al-'Aql wa al-Jahl of Usul al-Kafi, the study demonstrates that the Qur'an and narrations do not regard "ignorance" merely as a lack of information. Rather, in most cases, they consider it a blameworthy and avoidable "epistemic vice" resulting from the epistemic agent's failure to fulfill their cognitive responsibilities.
A content and ontological analysis of these verses reveals that ignorance is consistently accompanied by "misconceptions" about beings and concepts, and that these misconceptions themselves arise from the dominance of epistemic vices such as prejudice, arrogance, hastiness, uncritical acceptance of claims, and defiance against evidence. In contrast, the Qur'an and narrations introduce "epistemic conscientiousness" as a central and fundamental virtue for avoiding ignorance and attaining knowledge. This conscientiousness necessitates the application of a set of secondary epistemic virtues, including fairness, humility, self-restraint, patience, and open-mindedness.
This study shows that the theoretical framework of responsibilist virtue epistemology (particularly the views of Linda Zagzebski) provides a useful tool for systematizing Qur'anic and narrative teachings on ignorance. It further suggests that a constructive dialogue and mutual engagement between these two intellectual traditions is possible, without imposing one upon the other.